2 Lawsuits Against 21st Century for Failing to Pay Medical Payments Coverage

My clients were injured in a motor vehicle accident.  Before the accident, they wisely took out substantial automobile insurance to protect them, including coverages for bodily injury liability, uninsured motorists coverage, personal injury protection, and medical payments. 

As a result of the accident, they incurred medical expenses.  These medical expenses were properly submitted to their car insurer, 21st Century, under their PIP and Med Pay coverages.  The auto insurer paid 80% of the medical charges under PIP, but refused to use the Medical Payments coverage to pay the remaining 20%.  (PIP in Florida pays the first 80% of medical charges, typically up to a limit of $10,000.  Med Pay is intended to pay any amounts not paid by PIP). 

The insurance company says that, based on its insurance policy, it doesn't have to pay anything under the Medical Payments coverage until the PIP is totally exhausted.  In reality, the insurance policy states that the Medical Payments coverage is "excess" over the PIP.  This means that the insurer is required to pay any amounts that are in excess of the 80% paid by PIP. 

Today, I filed a declaratory judgment action against 21st Century insurance to have a judge determine if my interpretation is correct, or if the insurer's interpretation is correct. 

As with most of my insurance cases, if I win, the insurance company will be required to pay my fees and costs, and if I lose, I'll work for free. 

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11th Circuit Issues Opinion on MCS 90 and Coverage Continuing After Expiration of Policy

In Waters v. Miller, ____ F.3d ____ (11th Cir. April 15, 2009), Waters was rear-ended by Miller's tractor-trailer on November 29, 2005.  At the time of the accident, Miller was hauling cars from Florida to Georgia.  Miller carried commercial vehicle insurance with Progressive Express Insurance Company.  Progressive denied the claim asserting that the policy period was September 11, 2004 - September 11, 2005, and that the insured did not pay the premium to extend the policy past its expiration date of September 11, 2005.   

Waters filed a declaratory judgment action against Progressive, arguing that 1) pursuant to Florida Statue Section 320.02(5)(e), Progressive's policy remained in effect until Progressive notified the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles that the policy had been canceled; and 2) Progressive knew or should have known that Miller was engaged in interstate trucking and that as a result, an MCS-90 endorsement should be read into the policy. 

Section 320.02(5)(e) states that a policy insuring commercial motor vehicles "may not be canceled on less than 30 days written notice by the insurer to the [FDHSMV]."  However, in this case, the 11th Circuit held that this statute does not apply when a policy expires as opposed to when a policy is canceled. 

Under the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, 49 U.S.C. Section 10101 et seq., and the regulations promulgated thereunder, certain interstate motor carriers must obtain an insurance policy containing an MCS-90 endorsement "providing that the insurer will pay within policy limits any judgment recovered against the insured motor carrier for liability resulting from the carrier's negligence[.]"  Coverage from policies containing an MCS-90 endorsement remains in effect until the insurance company gives 30 days' written notice to the FMCSA.  See, 49 C.F.R. Sections 387.15, 387.313(d). 

The Progressive policy at issue did not contain an MCS-90 endorsement, however, Miller argued that one should be incorporated into the Progressive policy because Progressive knew or should have known that Waters was engaged in interstate travel.  The 11th Circuit held that Waters did not present sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that Progressive knew or should have known Miller was driving the tractor-trailer interstate. 

Importantly, the 11th Circuit specifically held that because Waters failed to provide sufficient evidence that Progressive knew or should have known that Miller was engaged in interstate trucking the Court found it

unnecessary for us to reach the issue of whether the endorsement can be read into a policy that does not contain it, and we expressly decline to do so." 

In Footnote 3, the Court notes that "[s]ome court have incorporated the endorsement into policies as a matter of law." 

Dec Action Filed Seeking Declaration Concerning Amount of Available UM Benefits

Our client bought car insurance from Nationwide.  A few years later, Nationwide transferred the insurance to Allied insurance, a subsidiary of Nationwide.  Later, our client was injured in an automobile accident caused by an underinsured motorist.  Allied has stated that there is only $10,000 in UM available under the Allied policy.  Our client has $100,000 in bodily injury liability limits.  The law provides that an insurer can offer UM limits at a level lower than the bodily injury limits, if the insurer obtains a written request for the lower UM limits. 

Allied states that our client's husband signed a request for lower UM limits when he bought the Nationwide policy.  However, Florida Statute Section 627.727 says that the "insurer" must obtain a written request for the lower limits.  Nationwide is not the "insurer" for this accident, and Allied does not possess a written request that it provide lower UM limits.  Allied steadfastly relies on the Nationwide UM selection form.

I filed suit today seeking a judicial declaration that Allied is required to provide our client with $100,000 in uninsured motorists limits.  If I am successful, Allied will have to pay our fees and costs, and if I lose, I'll work for free. 

4th DCA (Mis?)Speaks on Releasing Future PIP Benefits

In United Automobile Insurance Company v. Palm Chiropractic Center, Inc., a/a/o Thomas, ____ So.3d ____ (Fla. 4th DCA 2010), the PIP insurer sent the insured for a compulsory medical examination.  Based on the results of the CME, the PIP insurer advised the insured's medical provider that it would not pay for any further chiropractic care.  The insurer sent a check to the provider which stated "Pay to the order of PALM CHIROPRACTIC CTR FOR FULL & FINAL PAYMENT OF PIP BENEFITS F/A/O JOYCE THOMAS."  Palm cashed the check.

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4th DCA Agrees that UM Insured Does Not Have to Sue At-Fault Driver Before Suing for UM Benefits

In Saris v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, ____ So.3d ____ (Fla. 4th DCA 2010), Saris carried uninsured motorists insurance with State Farm.  The insured was injured by a underinsured / uninsured motorist.  The insured did not pursue a claim against the person who caused the accident, but instead filed an uninsured motorists claim against State Farm.

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Interstate Trucking and the MCS-90 Endorsement

 Mr. and Mrs. Yeates were severely injured when the vehicle Mrs. Yeates was driving was struck head-on by a livestock truck owned by Bingham Livestock.  The Yeateses sued Bingham Livestock and the truck driver.  Bingham Livestock carried two insurance policies, one issued by State Farm and one issued by Carolina Casualty. 

 State Farm tendered its policy limits of $750,000 to the Yeateses.  The Carolina Casualty policy did not specifically cover automobile accidents, but included a federally mandated MCS-90 endorsement, which provided Carolina Casualty would pay up to $1,000,000 for "any final judgment recovered against [Bingham Livestock] for public liability resulting from negligence in the operation, maintenance or use of motor vehicles." 

 

Federal law requires interstate common carriers to carry this MCS-90 endorsement which will provide insurance coverage up to $750,000.  The endorsement prevents insurance companies from denying claims even though the vehicle in the accident is not listed in the policy.

 

Carolina Casualty sued seeking a judicial ruling that the MCS-90 endorsement does not apply here.  Carolina Casualty argued that the MCS-90 endorsement is only implicated when the motor carrier has less than $750,000 in liability protection.  In this case, since State Farm already provided the minimum $750,000 in liability protection, according to Carolina Casualty, the MCS-90 was not needed to provide the minimum mandatory coverage.

 

The US Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit ruled that the MCS-90 did indeed provide insurance coverage for this crash.  The court ruled that the fact that State Farm paid its $750,000 policy limits did not relieve Carolina Casualty of its duty to pay.  According to the 10th Circuit, the federal regulations requiring a minimum of $750,000 in coverage provides a floor, and not a ceiling.  Carolina Casualty Company v. Yeates, 533 So.2d 1202 (10th Cir. 2008).

 

This case is a reminder to always pursue the MCS-90 coverage every time an interstate common carrier is involved.  Whenever one suspects the MCS-90 may be implicated, you should review the policy, the MCS-90 endorsement, as well as the MCS-90 implementing statute and applicable regulations, i.e. 49 U.S.C. §13906(f), and 49 C.F.R. § 387.15. 

 

Keep in mind that if the insurance company alleges that the MCS-90 has been cancelled for any reason, including failure to pay, the insurance company must make sure the cancellation procedures set forth in 49 C.F.R. § 387.15 have been strictly followed.     

 

Another issue comes up when the insurance company fails to provide an MCS-90 endorsement with the policy.  Depending on the circumstances, courts might incorporate the MCS-90 endorsement into the policy.  If the policy does not contain the MCS-90 endorsement, and the court refuses to incorporate one, then the insured may have a negligence action against its insurance agent if the agent failed to advise the insured of the need for the MCS-90, or failed to advise the insurance company of the need for the MCS-90. 

PIP Fee Schedules DO NOT Apply to Accidents Occurring Before 1/1/08

In Geico Indemnity Company v. Physicians Group, LLC, a/a/o Paul Androski, ____ So.3d ____ (Fla. 2nd DCA August 13, 2010), the 2nd DCA ruled that the PIP fee schedules which went into effect on January 1, 2008, do not apply to any accidents that occurred before that date. 

The opinion was fairly short and straightforward.  Specifically, the Court held that:

the 2008 version of section 627.736(a)(2)(f) does not retroactively apply to an insurance policy that was in effect and that expired before the statute's effective date of January 1, 2008. 

A copy of the 2nd DCA's opinion can be downloaded by clicking here. 

We should all expect that this decision will be appealed to the Florida Supreme Court.

My good friend Attorney Tom Player successfully handled the appeal for Physicians Group.  Great job Tom!  

Lawsuit Filed for Insurance Benefits

My client is a truck driver.  He was asked to deliver a load to North Carolina.  When he tried to attach the trailer to his own truck, the trailer would not properly attach.  The company which asked him to deliver the load then provided him with a truck to deliver the load.  Unfortunately, my client was injured when he was hit by another vehicle while in North Carolina. 

He carries full insurance coverage on his own truck, but that policy does not apply to accidents that occur out of state if he is in a vehicle he does not own.  However, the truck he was using to deliver the load was insured with a policy that provided coverage for personal injury protection (PIP), and medical payments coverage (Med Pay).  That insurance company denied all claims regarding the accident.  The insurer claimed there was no PIP because my client carried PIP on his own vehicle (PIP which does not apply to out of state accidents which occur in a non-owned vehicle).  The insurer claimed there was no Med Pay because the Med Pay coverage has an exclusion for any "employees" of the company for which he was working.  

I do not believe that either exclusion applies.  Under Florida Statute Section 627.736, a PIP policy can only have a few "authorized exclusions."  The exclusion being applied by the insurance company in this case is not one of those authorized exclusions.  I do not believe that the Med Pay exclusion applies because my client is not an "employee" of the delivery company.  He was an independent contractor.  

Because the insurance company has denied coverage, I filed a declaratory judgment action to have a court determine whether the exclusions actually apply.  As with all exclusion in insurance policies, the burden of proof will be on the insurance company to prove that the exclusions apply.  

As with most of my insurance cases, there are no fees or costs to my client.  If I win, the insurance company must pay my attorney's fees and costs, and if I lose, I'll work for free.   

Lawsuit Filed Against Auto Insurance Company for Denying Claim to "Regular Operator"

My client owns an HVAC business and insures his business and two vehicles through Infinity Insurance.  His son had an accident while driving one of his business vehicles.  The son rarely drives that vehicle.  There was damage to the company vehicle, and claims have been presented against the HVAC business for damages.

Infinity denied the claim, on the basis that the policy excludes coverage for "regular operators" of company vehicles who are not disclosed to Infinity.  Prior to this crash, the son had driven the vehicle in question only a few times.  "Regular Operator" is not defined in the policy, however, numerous cases define "regular operator" as someone who repeatedly drives a vehicle which is generally available to his use.  This case does not fall into that definition. 
 

As a result, I filed a declaratory judgment action against Infinity Insurance seeking a declaration from the court that this accident is covered. 

As with most cases such as this, if I win, the insurance company will pay all my fees and costs, and if I lose, I'll work for free. 

Lawsuit Filed Against Auto Insurer for Improperly Cancelling Insurance and then Denying Claim

My client pays cash for his automobile insurance.  He makes his payments to his insurance agent.  After being involved in a very serious multi-vehicle accident, his car insurance company told him that it had canceled his insurance for non-payment of premium before the accident. 

My client has records showing that his payments were in fact made.  Further, the insurance company has been unable to produce a copy of the a cancellation notice.  Pursuant to Florida Statute Section 627.728, an insurer must provide its insured with a 10 day cancellation notice prior to canceling insurance for non-payment of premium.  My client insists he did not receive a cancellation notice, and, as noted, the insurance company cannot provide one.  Pur. 627.728, the insurance company must also produce a United States Postal Proof of Mailing form in order to prove it properly canceled the insurance.  In this case, the insurance company cannot produce the proof of mailing either.   

I filed suit today against the insurance company for breach of contract.  I included a counts for

  • declaratory relief, 
  • failing to pay the damages caused in the accident, 
  • loss of use of his vehicle, and 
  • increased expenses in the future for the increased costs of having to buy insurance after a cancellation.  (After a cancellation, future insurance companies will charge a higher premium because of the prior cancellation). 

As a lawyer representing car owners, I have handled many cases against automobile insurers for improper cancellations.  In almost all of those cases, if I win, the insurance company will be responsible for my attorneys fees and costs, and if I lose, I'll work for free. Initial consultations are always free.

Rental Car Did Not Qualify as a "Temporary Substitute Auto"

In GEICO Indemnity Company v. Kutasha, ____ So.3d ____ (Fla. 1st DCA March 10, 2010), Shazier rented a car from Avis.  Shazier then loaned the car to Jordan.  Jordan crashed the Avis rental car.  Multiple parties sued Shazier, Jordan and Avis for injuries and death. 

Shazier had rented the car when her vehicle was down for repairs.  She was insured with GEICO.  The GEICO policy provided coverage for a "temporary substitute auto" which was defined as

a private passenger, farm, or utility auto or trailer, not owned by you, temporarily used with the permission of the owner.  This vehicle must be used as a substitute for the owned auto or trailer when withdrawn from normal use because of its breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or destruction.

The Avis rental agreement contained a provision that stated that Shazier was the only authorized driver, and that allowing anyone else to drive "will automatically terminate your rental."

The 1st DCA made short work of this case holding that the rental car was not a "temporary substitute auto" because at the time of the accident it was not being "used with the permission of the owner."  Indeed, according to the Court, "Jordan's use of the rental car automatically revoked the permission granted to Shazier by Avis." 

Lloyds Estopped from Asserting "Garaging Warranty" by Failing to Deliver Policy

In Lloyds Underwriters v. Keystone Equipment Finance Corp., 25 So3d 89 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009), the insured obtained an insurance policy from Lloyds providing liability coverage on a commercial tractor-trailer.  The policy's effective date was November 30, 2004.  The tractor-trailer was stolen December 18, 2004.  The policy provided coverage for loss due to theft, but Lloyds denied the claim, relying on a "Garaging or Secured Yard Warranty" contained in the policy.  This garaging warranty required the insured to "warrant" that the vehicle would be kept in a closed garage, in an enclosed 24-hour guarded lot, or parked adjacent to the insured's residence.  A breach of this warranty "shall result in denial of claim or any rights of recovery hereunder." 

The insured sued Lloyds for breach of contract alleging that Lloyds was estopped from relying, or waived its right to rely, upon the garaging warranty because Lloyds had failed to comply with the notice and delivery requirements of Florida Statutes Section 627.421 and 626.922, and the insured had not otherwise been provided notice of the garaging warranty.  Section 627.421 requires delivery of the insurance policy not more than sixty days after effectuation of coverage.  Section 626.922 requires the surplus lines agent to "promptly issue and deliver to the insured" either the policy or, if the policy is not "then available, a certificate, cover note, or other confirmation of insurance" showing, amount other things, "coverage, conditions, and term of insurance."  Section 626.922(1).  Section 626.922(4) provides that "[a] copy of the policy or cover note or confirmation of insurance shall be delivered to the insured within 60 days after the effectuation of coverage." 

The insured provided an affidavit wherein he swore that the loss occurred on December 18, 2004, that he had not received a copy of the binder or policy prior to the loss, and that he had not otherwise received written or verbal notice of the garaging warranty.  The insured did file a copy of the binder issued by the insurance agent, bearing a date of January 2, 2005, and the Lloyds' policy, listing February 9, 2005, as the date printed on the schedules of equipment and drivers. 

Lloyds did not dispute these facts, but merely argued that Florida law expressly provides that the doctrines of estoppel and waiver may not be applied to create coverage that does not otherwise exist. 

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the insured.  On appeal, the 4th DCA affirmed.

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New Lawsuit Filed for Gap Insurance

I filed suit today against Auto Gap Insurance Company for failing to pay benefits under a gap insurance policy.  My client purchased gap insurance when she purchased her car.  (Gap insurance is intended to pay a borrower for the "gap" between what is owed on a vehicle and the market value of the vehicle in the event the vehicle is totaled.) 

My client's vehicle was totaled in a crash.  Her auto insurer paid what was due under her collision coverage which left a substantial "gap" for her to pay.  She submitted her this loss to Auto Gap Insurance Company which stated that it had never issued a policy to her.  Contrary to Auto Gap's assertion, my client has an actual original policy issued by Auto Gap Insurance Company.  She also has her original "deal file" from the car dealer that sold her her vehicle.  The Retail Installment Sales Contract and her Bill of Sale both document that she paid for the gap insurance.  

The lawsuit also includes a count against the car dealer which sold the policy to my client.  The allegations against the car dealer result from the fact that it appears that the actual gap insurance company is not an authorized insurer in Florida.  Florida Statute Section 626.901 makes anyone who aids an unauthorized insurer in selling insurance liable for all losses that would be otherwise covered under the policy issued by the unauthorized insurer.  Pursuant to section 626.911, anyone who aids an unauthorized insurer in selling insurance in Florida is liable for attorneys fees and costs if I am successful. 

GEICO Waives "Coverage Defenses" by Failing to Comply with the Claims Administration Statute

My client's vehicle was involved a horrendous motor vehicle accident.  Within hours of the accident, he claimed that his car had been stolen after leaving the keys in the trunk.  Months later, he pled guilty to criminal charges of leaving the scene of the accident with injuries and death. 

GEICO insured my client and the vehicle for the accident.  My client was sued by one of the injured parties, and the estate of a person who was killed in the crash.  GEICO appointed a defense attorney, and advised my client that it was defending the suits under a reservation of rights.  GEICO also filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to disclaim coverage based on various coverage defenses, including material misrepresentation in the presentation of the claim, late notice, and failure to cooperate. 

Pursuant to Florida Statue Section 627.426(2)(b) an insurer waives all "coverage defenses" unless within 60 days of receiving the lawsuit against its insured, the insurer:  1) gives written notice of its refusal to defend; 2) obtains a written non-waiver agreement; or 3) retains mutually agreeable counsel to defend the lawsuit.

In this case, GEICO failed to comply with any of these three options.  Instead, it simply appointed counsel under a reservation of rights.  Florida cases hold that appointing counsel is the "antithesis" of retaining mutually agreeable counsel. 

On Wednesday, the trial court granted summary judgment to my client, holding that GEICO had indeed waived all coverage defenses.  This is a great victory for those injured and killed in the crash. 

Employer's Auto Policy Doesn't Apply to Injuries to an Employee

Cabellero was driving a company vehicle on the job when he crashed, killing himself and injuring Bautista, a co-employee.  Bautista sued Caballero's estate for his personal injuries.  Mercury Insurance, the employer's commercial auto carrier, brought a declaratory judgment action against Bautista seeking a declaration that an exclusion precluded coverage under its policy. 

Cross motions for summary judgment were filed.  The trial court denied Mercury's motion and granted Bautista's motion, ruling that there was insurance coverage for the crash.  The 4th DCA reversed. 

The exclusion at issue states that there is no coverage for, and Mercury's duty to defend "does not apply to"

6.  Bodily injury to an employee of an insured ... arising out of or within the course of employment, except with respect to a domestic employee if benefits are neither paid nor required to be provided under any Workers' Compensation, disability benefits or other similar law.  This exclusion applies whether the insured may be liable as an employer or in any other capacity and to any obligation to share damages with or repay someone else who must pay damages because of the injury.

The 4th found that the exclusion applied in this scenario.  It noted that: 

There is no dispute (1) that Charlies's [the employer] is 'an insured' within the meaning of the exclusion, (2) that Bautista was an employee of Charlie's, and (3) that Bautista's injuries arose out of or within the course of his employment with Charlie's. 

The Court rejected Bautista's argument that "an insured" must refer only to Cabellero, because Cabellero is the only "insured" he has sued.  "The exclusion is not confined to the parameters of a particular lawsuit, but is directed at the facts of the accident for which coverage is sought.  There is not getting around the fact that Charlie's is "an insured" under the policy."

Mercury Insurance Company of Florida v. Bautista, ____ So.3d ____ (Fla. 4th DCA February 24, 2010). 

Bautista's attorney made a valiant effort in showing that the exclusion either did not apply in these circumstances, or was ambiguous, by pointing out that "an insured" must refer to the employer and in this case, the employer was simply not sued. 

As with all insurance coverage cases, the outcome of this case, was dependent on the precise language in the policy.  While the Court found that this particular policy did not provide coverage, another policy, under the exact same circumstances may. 

Suit Filed Against Florida Farm Bureau for Improper Cancellation of Auto Policy

I filed suit today on behalf of a client against Florida Farm Bureau for improperly canceling her automobile insurance.  In order to properly cancel automobile insurance, an insurer must strictly comply with Florida Statute Sections 627.728, 627.7281 and 627.7283.  My client was involved in an accident, and submitted the claim for Florida Farm Bureau.  Florida Farm Bureau denied the claim, asserting that it had canceled her insurance prior to the accident.  However, to the extent that Florida Farm Bureau attempted to cancel the policy, it did not comply with the above statutes, and therefore coverage was in force at the time of the accident. 

After the accident, my client was required to obtain insurance with another insurer.  That insurer charged a much higher premium rate because of the alleged cancellation.  (Whenever applying for insurance, the new insurer asks whether the proposed insured has ever been canceled, or non renewed.  If so, they charge a higher rate for the new policy.)  This higher premium rate usually lasts about 10 years after the cancellation/non-renewal.  In addition to other damages, I am seeking reimbursement of this increased premium rate as part of my client's damages in this case.    

As with most of these cases against my client's own insurer, the insurance company must pay my fees and costs if I win, and if I lose, I'll work for free.  I will keep you posted.

Lawsuit Filed Because Allstate Won't Pay Its Insured's Collision Damage

My client is insured with Allstate automobile insurance.  She was in a one car accident, which resulted in body damage to the car, and the destruction of her clutch.  Allstate agreed to pay for the body damage, but refused to pay for the clutch. 

I filed suit today to try to force Allstate to pay for the damage to the clutch.  As with most of these case, if I win the insurance company must pay for my fees and costs, and if I lose, I'll work for free. 

4th DCA Agrees With 3rd That 627.736(7)(a) "Valid Report" Does Not Require a Physical Examination

In Central Magnetic Imaging Open MRI of Plantation, Ltd a/a/o v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Insurance Company, ____ So.3d ____ (Fla. 4th DCA November 18, 2009), State Farm received an MRI bill on one of its PIP insureds.  State Farm sent the MRI bill and its PIP insured's medical records to be reviewed by its own physician to determine if the MRI  was reasonable, necessary and related to a motor vehicle accident.  State Farm did not have its PIP insured physically examined by its physician. 

Based on the report for the reviewing physician, State Farm denied payment for the bill.  The MRI facility, as assignee of the insured, filed suit against State Farm for breach of the insurance contract.  On summary judgment in the county court, the MRI facility argued that State Farm was required by 627.736(7)(a) to obtain a "valid report" prior to denying the MRI bill.  The MRI facility argued that an essential element of a "valid report" was that State Farm had to obtain a physical exam of its insured prior to denying the bill.  The county court agreed, but the circuit court reversed finding that no physical examination was necessary. 

The 4th DCA denied the petition for certiorari, finding that the circuit court applied the correct law.  According to the 4th

We conclude, in line with the Third District Court of Appeal, that the 'valid report' required by the statute does not require an insurer to order an IME before denying a claim for PIP benefits.

In a footnote, the 4th did note that

Although the issue was not raised in this case, we note that other districts have held that the valid report requirement of section 627.736(7)(a) does not apply at all in a case such as this....  [However, in this case, t]he insurer conceded that the valid report requirements applied to the claim in this case.

As previously noted in this blog, numerous cases have held that 627.736(7)(a) only applies to the withdrawal of future benefits, and section (4)(b) applies to the denial of a past bill.  Section (4)(b) does not require a report at all.  Section (4)(b) merely requires an insurer to provide "reasonable proof" that the bill is not owed, and such "reasonable proof" can be produced at any time. 

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Important Decision on Fee Multiplier Issued by 1st DCA

Today, in Massie v. Progressive Express Insurance Company, ____ So.3d ____ (Fla. 1st DCA November 17, 2009), the Circuit Court sitting in its appellate capacity reversed the trial judge's order awarding a multiplier.  The Circuit Court reversed because the insured did not testify that she had difficulty securing counsel to represent her in the cause without a multiplier.   

The 1st DCA reversed and reinstated the multiplier.  The Court held that

expert testimony that a party would have difficulty securing counsel without the opportunity for a multiplier supposts a multiplier's imposition.  Here, Petitioner presented such testimony, and the Circuit Court departed from the essential requirements of law by failing to apply a principle of law previously enunciated by this Court rather than that of our sister Fifth Disctrict Court of Appeal. 

The 5th DCA decision which the Court was referring to is Progressive Express Insurance Co. v. Schultz, 948 So.2d 1027 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007).  I was actually the fee expert in Schultz and have been regretting this holding for about 2 years now.  Hopefully, now that there is conflict between Schultz and Massie the Supreme Court will rule on this issue. 

A copy of the Massie decision can be downloaded by clicking here.

3rd DCA Holds that a "Valid Report" Used by PIP Insurer to Withdraw Benefits Need Not Be Based on a Physical Exam by the Reviewing Physician

In United Automobile Insurance Co. v. Garrido, a/a/o Rodriguez, ____ So.3d ____ (Fla. 3d DCA October 28, 2009), the 3rd once spoke on the circumstances under which a PIP insurer can withdraw future PIP benefits.  According to the 3rd,

a 'valid report,' even where appropriately required under section 627.736(7)(a) [i.e. when withdrawing future benefits - as opposed to denying past bills], need not be predicated on either a physical examination conducted by the reporting physician or on a physical examination conducted on behalf of the insurance company. 

The Court also confirmed once again, that a "valid report" is only necessary when a PIP insurer is withdrawing future PIP benefits, and is not needed where the PIP insurer is denying past bills.

[I]n cases such as this, where no payments have been made resulting in a total rejection of a provider's bills, section 627.736(4) of the Florida Statutes applies.  This provision permits an insurer to deny a PIP claim at any time, either before or after that claim becomes 'overdue [because not paid within thirty days]' provided is has 'reasonable proof' that it is not responsible for payment.  And, while such proof may come in the form of a report described in section 627.736(7)(a), such a report is not necessary to deny a claim under section 627.736(4)(b). 

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PIP Insurer Only Needs a Written Medical Report Prior to Withdrawing Future Benefits, Not Prior For Denying Past Benefits

In United Automobile Insurance Company v. Garrido, a/a/o Alarcon, ____ So.3d ____ (Fla. 3rd DCA October 28, 2009), United Auto - a PIP insurer - denied payment for past services rendered by Dr. Garrido to the insured.  United Auto did not first obtain a written report from a physician saying that the denied charges were not reasonable, necessary or related to the crash. 

The 3rd held:

In United Automobile Insurance Co. v. Millennium Diagnostic Imaging Center, Inc., 12 So.3d 242, 246-47 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009), we held that an insurer may at any time challenge whether treatment is RRN, and is permitted to rely on a report obtained pursuant to section 627.736(7)(a) even when the report is obtained more than thirty days after the claim was submitted.  Building on this conclusion, we explained in United Automobile Insurance Co. v. Santa Fe Medical Center, No. 3D08-547, 2009 WL 3188957 (Fla. 3d DCA October 7, 2009), that an insurer's obligation, pursuant to section 627.736(7)(a), to first obtain a medical report, applied only to withdrawal - as opposed to denial - of payment to a treating physician.  Here, United denied payment.  Accordingly, the 'first obtained' language of section 627.736(7)(a) is not controlling and the court erred in finding otherwise.

What does it all mean...For a PIP insurer to deny past bills, it can obtain a report/expert/opinion that the bills are not RRN at any time - presumably up until the insured files for summary judgment at which time the PIP insurer probably needs to come up with some evidence.  For a PIP insurer to withdraw future treatment, the insurer must first obtain a written report from a physician pursuant to 627.736(7)(a).  (Does that report need to based on a physical examination performed by the insurance company physician?  Stay tuned, I'm blogging on that in exactly 1 minute). 

 

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"Valid Report" Not Needed for Denial of PIP Benefits (Only for Withdrawal of PIP Benefits)

In United Automobile Insurance Company v. Santa Fe Medical Center, ____ So.3d ____ (Fla. 3d DCA October 7, 2009), the medical provider took an assignment of PIP benefits from its patient.  Santa Fe submitted bills to United Auto for treatment rendered, and United Auto denied payment claiming that the treatment was not reasonable, necessary or related to the subject accident. 

United Auto did not obtain a written report from a physician prior to denying the claim.  Much later, in response to Santa Fe's motion for summary judgment, United Auto did obtain an affidavit from a physician supporting its denial of the claim.  The trial court rejected United Auto's affidavit because: (1) it was based upon his review of the patient's treatment records, rather than a physical examination of Mr. Lopez, and (2) United Auto's physician did not conduct his review or submit his affidavit within thirty days of United Auto's receipt of the claim.  United Auto appealed to the Circuit Court which affirmed the trial court on these two issues.  United Auto sought certiorari review from the 3rd DCA.  

The 3rd DCA reversed.  The Court noted a clear distinction between the denial of a past bill which is controlled by subsection (4)(b) of the PIP statute; and the withdrawal of future benefits which is controlled by subsection (7)(a).  According to the 3rd,

[b]ecause this is a denial case, subsection (4)(b) applies.  Subsection (4)(b) provides that the insurer must pay benefits that are reasonable, related, and necessary within thirty days after receiving written notice, and the failure to do so could subject the insurer to penalties.  However, if the insurer believes that the claim is not reasonable, related, and necessary and denies the claim, it may obtain and offer reasonable proof at any time to establish that the insurer is not responsible for payment of the claim....  'Reasonable proof' is not defined, but it is clear that subsection (4)(b) does not require that a 'valid report' be obtained to protect an insurer from being assessed statutory penalties when denying a claim.  It is important to note that the statute does not require the insurer to obtain a report or proof under subsection (4)(b) before denying a claim. 

In conclusion, the Court stated:

If the insurer believes the claim is not reasonable, related, and necessary, it may: (1) deny the claim; or (2) pay the claim until it obtains a valid medical report under subsection (7)(a) and withdraw further payment.  'Reasonable proof' when defending an insurer's decision to deny payment of a claim under subsection (4)(b) does not require that the insurer obtain a valid report pursuant to subsection (7)(a), and the insurer may contest its responsibility to pay a claim at any time, and present evidence obtained after the thirty-day period has expired.  Subsection (7)(a), which requires that the insurer obtain a valid medical report, only applies to instances where the insurer withdraws the payment of further PIP benefits, not to the denial or reduction of benefits claimed. 

Be aware, that in its opinion, the Court also noted that in withdrawal cases under subsection (7)(a), that an insurer's "valid report" "may be based on the reporting physician's review of another physician's examination," or the reviewing physicians own physical examination. 

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3rd DCA Denies Rehearing in UM Case Where State Farm Policy Conflicts with 627.727

On May 28, 2009, I blogged on Diaz-Hernandez v. State Farm Casualty Insurance Company, ____ So.3d ____, (May 27, 2009), wherein the 3rd DCA held that:

the provision in the UM policy, requiring the Insured to join the uninsured motorist in the lawsuit filed against the UM carrier, State Farm, is against public policy, we reverse the order dismissing the Insured's second amended complaint with prejudice, and remand for further proceedings.

State Farm moved for rehearing, and on October 14, 2009, the 3rd denied the rehearing

on the basis of the rule, well-stated by the panel, that a policy provision cannot lawfully restrict the rights of a UM insured beyond those specifically provided by statue.

In its ruling, the Court relied on the Supreme Courts ruling in Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Co. v. Tepper, 2 So.3d 209 (Fla. 2009) (which I blogged on February 24, 2009).  The Court further noted that the 11th Circuit's ruling in Bodden v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 195 F. App'x 858 (11th Cir. 2006) upholding the validity of this very same clause, "could not survive the majority decision in Tepper.

3rd DCA Holds that Insurer can Withdraw PIP Benefits Based on Records Review as Long as Records Document a Physical Exam by the Treating Doctor

In United Automobile Insurance Company v. Metro Injury & Rehab Center, ___ So.3d ___ (Fla. 3rd DCA July 29, 2009), the PIP insurer withdrew PIP benefits based on a peer review of the treating doctor's records.  Those records contained information concerning physical examination(s) which the treating physician performed on the insured.  The county court granted summary judgment against the PIP insurer, and the circuit court, sitting in its appellate capacity, affirmed, holding that "[a] report based only upon a review of the records of the insured's treating physician is not a valid report within the meaning of section 627.736(7)(a)."  The court reasoned that the statute required the reviewing physician to perform a physical examination of the insured.   

The 3rd agreed that a physical examination of the patient was a necessary ingredient of "valid report," but held that

the physician preparing the report does not have to personally examine the insured.  He or she may base the report on another physician's examination whether an IME or an examination conducted by the treating physician.

It is unclear whether other DCA's will follow this reasoning.  Other DCA's may require that the examiantion be performed by the CME physician, or someone at his direction.  We shall see. 

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3rd DCA Holds PIP Insurer Can Retroactively Rescind for Material Misrep in Application

Pursuant to Florida Statute Section 627.409, an insurer can retroactively rescind a policy if it later finds a material misrepresentation in the application for insurance.  A misrepresentation is "material" if the misrepresentation was material to the acceptance of the risk by the insurer, or, if the insurer in good faith would not have issued the policy under the same terms and premium. 

In United Automobile Insurance Company v. Salgado, _____ So.3d. _____ (Fla. 3rd DCA August 5, 2009), the PIP insurer discovered a material misrepresentation after its insured presented it with a PIP claim.  The PIP insurer then rescinded the policy, pursuant to 627.409.  The County Court held that a PIP insurer was not entitled to retroactively rescind a PIP policy pursuant to 627.409.  In essence, the County Court reasoned that PIP is a statutorily mandated coverage and pursuant to the PIP statute claims can only be denied prospectively, not retroactively.  The Circuit Court, sitting in its appellate capacity, affirmed. 

The 3rd DCA reversed, holding that, pursuant to 627.409, a PIP insurer can retroactively rescind a PIP policy if it meets the requirements of 627.409. 

3rd DCA Rules that Insured Need Not Comply with State Farm's UM Provisions that Conflict with 627.727

In Diaz-Hernandez v. State Farm Casualty Insurance Company, ____ So.2d ____ (May 27, 2009), the court was asked to resolve the following issue:

We must decide whether the provision in State Farm's UM policy, which requires the Insured to file suit against the known uninsured motorist and State Farm, is against the public policy of the UM statute, section 627.727, Florida Statutes (2007), and therefore, void.

In a rather straightforward opinion, the court held that:

the provision in the UM policy, requiring the Insured to join the uninsured motorist in the lawsuit filed against the UM carrier, State Farm, is against public policy, we reverse the order dismissing the Insured's second amended complaint with prejudice, and remand for further proceedings.

In its reasoning, the court noted that the State Farm policy imposed an "additional burden" on the Insured that was not required by the UM Statute.  This additional burden on the Insured required that the policy term by deemed invalid. 

This decision in in line with case law in Florida which holds that a UM insurer cannot require its insured to pursue an uninsured motorist to a judgment or settlement prior to proceeding against its insurer.  See, Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Reyer, 362 So.2d 390 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1978).  See also, Metro. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Tepper, 2 So.3d 209 (Fla. 2009). 

A copy of the Diaz-Hernandez can be downloaded by clicking here

 

First Party Bad Faith Judgment Reversed

Recently, Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeals reversed a First Party Bad Faith verdict and judgment. In United Automobile Insurance Company v. Colon, Ms. Colon sued her PIP insurer for bad faith claims handling in failing to pay her doctors under her PIP policy. Although she disclaimed any non-economic damages for emotional distress, the insured claimed that the carrier's failure to pay PIP benefits caused her problems with doctors who refused to compromise the amount of her bills or render further medical services. However, the insured offered no particular amount of damages related to the problems she had with her providers. The jury returned a general verdict for bad faith damages of $60,000.

The 4th DCA noted that "[i]t has long been accepted in Florida that a party claiming economic losses must produce evidence justifying a definite amount.... Economic damages may not be founded on jury speculation or guesswork and must rest on some reasonable factual basis." The DCA then held that: "As the background shows, plaintiff offered no evidence on which to justify any amount of economic damages resulting from the carrier's bad faith conduct. Because of the lack of such evidence, the carrier is entitled to judgment in its favor on plaintiff's claim for bad faith damages."

While I don't know from the facts of this case whether the plaintiff could have done so, this case points out the necessity to prove up economic damages in a first party bad faith case. Economic damages in a case such as Colon might include impairment of credit which can be proved up by expert testimony. A plaintiff in a first party bad faith action may also be entitled to non-economic damages, even in the absence of economic damages. 

The insurance company's agent is a fiduciary to the insured.  An insured pursuing a first party bad faith claim should always evaluate the propriety of adding a claim for the agent's breach of fiduciary duty.  The elements of a claim for breach of fiduciary duty are: the existence of a fiduciary duty, and the breach of that duty such that it is the proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages.  In Gracey v. Eaker, 837 So. 2d 348, 353 (Fla. 2002)., the Florida Supreme Court held that the victim of a breach of fiduciary duty is entitled to non-economic damages, even in the absence of economic damages.
 

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Supreme Court Rules on When Uninsured Motorist Carrier Can Pursue Subrogation

In Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Company v. Tepper, 34 FLW S111 (Jan. 30, 2009) the Florida Supreme Court resolved a direct conflict between the 5th DCA and the 2nd DCA concerning when an uninsured motorists carrier can begin a subrogation action against the at-fault driver/owner.

In general, under Florida Statute Section 627.727, if the insured intends to seek UM benefits, the insured must notify the UM carrier whenever the insured wishes to settle a case with the at-fault driver/owner. The UM carrier then has 30 days from receipt of the notice to either agree to the settlement, in which case the UM carrier waives its rights of subrogation against the at-fault driver/owner; or the UM carrier can pay the amount that the at-fault driver/owner is offering in settlement of the claim, in which case the UM carrier preserves its rights of subrogation against the at-fault driver/owner. (The UM carrier also waives its rights of subrogation if it fails to properly respond to the insured’s request within 30 days of receipt of the notice).

The question in Tepper, was when can the UM carrier initiate the subrogation action after paying its insured the amount which was being offered by the at-fault driver/owner.

The UM Statute says that “upon final resolution of the underinsured motorist claim, the underinsured motorists insurer is entitled to seek subrogation against the underinsured motorist and the liability insurer for the amounts paid to the injured party.” Fla. Stat. § 627.727(6)(b). The 2nd DCA held that this language allowed the UM carrier to file the subrogation action as soon as the UM carrier paid its insured the amount being offered by the underinsured motorist; while the 5th DCA held that this language required that the UM carrier wait until after its insured’s UM claim against it had been finally resolved before the UM carrier could initiate the subrogation action.

The Supreme Court affirmed the 5th DCA, holding that the final resolution of the entire UM claim was a “condition precedent to the UM carrier’s entitlement to bringing a subrogation action.” Recognizing that this holding could prejudice UM carriers when the underlying UM claim was not concluded before the 4 year tort statute of limitations had expired, the Supreme Court also held that the statute of limitations for the subrogation claim does not begin to run until the entire underlying UM claim has concluded.
 

Fourth DCA Rules on "Additional" PIP

In Flaxman v. Government Employees Ins. Co.,  993 So.2d 597 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), the insured had PIP with GEICO which paid statutorily mandated benefits of 80% of medical expenses as well as 60% of lost wages up to a total of $10,000. The insured also had available under the same policy "Additional" PIP or APIP which increased the amount of PIP benefits up to 100% of medical expenses and 85% of lost wages.

The insured incurred $17,000 of medical expenses as a direct result of a covered automobile accident. GEICO argued that the most that they were required to pay under the policy, including both PIP and APIP, was $10,000. The insured argued that GEICO was required to pay $10,000 under the PIP portion of the policy, and $2,500 under the APIP portion of the policy. Suit ensued, and the issue eventually worked its way up to the 4th DCA.

The 4th DCA ruled in favor of GEICO, and held that the APIP did not increase the aggregate benefits available under the policy. The aggregate available benefits under the policy remained $10,000. The APIP merely increased the percentage which GEICO had to pay for covered expenses, i.e., instead of paying 80% of covered medical expenses, GEICO had to pay 100% of covered medical expenses up to $10,000.

In reaching its decision, the court relied heavily on the "limit of liability" section of the policy which limited GEICO's total exposure to an aggregate of $10,000. From the decision it does not appear that GEICO's "Additional" PIP carried a separate limit of liability. In other words, the APIP did not have a limit of say $2,000, or $5,000. Instead, the APIP merely paid the additional percentages for covered expenses. The outcome would likely be different if the Additional PIP had a separately stated limit amount.

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1st DCA Denies Uninsured Motorists Coverage Under an Umbrella Policy

On January 8, 2009, the 1st DCA decided O'Brien v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 34 FLW D110a. In O’Brien, Mr. O’Brien purchased a $1,000,000 umbrella policy from State Farm. He rejected UM coverage in writing on the umbrella. Thereafter, Mr. O'Brien added vehicles which were covered under the umbrella policy, and ultimately added his 4 children as they began to drive.

Tragically, sometime later, Mr. O’Brien’s daughter was killed by an underinsured driver. State Farm tendered the limits on the underlying policies which included UM, but refused to pay anything under the umbrella.

The trial court agreed with State Farm about the lack of coverage, and the 1st DCA affirmed. The 1st DCA analyzed Section 627.727(2), Fla. Stat., (the section of the UM statute dealing with umbrella policies), and held that it only requires an insurer to make UM “available as part of the application, and at the written request of an insured.”  The Court stated there was no need to obtain another waiver of UM coverage under the umbrella after the initial waiver was obtained. The Court noted that subsection (2) does not contain the same strict notice requirements as subsection (1) (the section dealing with primary policies), but implied that even under subsection (1) there would have been no need for additional waivers under these circumstances as long as the other requirements of subsection (1) had been met.

The 1st DCA distinguished Strochak v. Federal Ins. Co., 717 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 1998)(holding that when moving from New Jersey to Florida, excess insurer was required to obtain a new UM rejection/selection form when vehicles first become registered or principally garaged in Florida and when the policy is delivered or issued for delivery in Florida); and Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Pohlman, 485 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1986)(holding that insured entered a “separate and severable contract of insurance” when an automobile policy endorsement added coverage for an additional vehicle after Section 627.4132, Fla. Stat., had been amended to permit stacking.)
 

Nation Law Firm Files Suit for PIP Insurance Benefits Arising from Road-Rage Incident

While our client was stopped at a traffic light, another driver got out of his car and attacked our client in a random road rage incident.  Our injured client submitted her medical bills to her PIP No-Fault insurer, Nationwide, for reimbursement.  PIP insurers in Florida are required to pay for all medical expenses that are "related" to the "use, operation or maintenance" of a motor vehicle. The PIP insurer alleged that this incident was not "related" to the use of the motor vehicle, but instead was an intentional criminal assault which it believes is not covered by the insurance policy.

In Blish v. Atlanta Casualty Company, 736 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. 1999), the Florida Supreme Court noted:

Acts of violence are an ageless and foreseeable hazard associated with the use of a vehicle-for once a person sets out in a vehicle, he or she is vulnerable. The highwaymen and desperados of bygone times preyed on the wayfarer, and these villains are with us still. Each Floridian today, when he or she gets behind the wheel, faces a variety of dangers: a car-jacking at a stoplight, or a strong-arm robbery at a deliberately staged rear-end collision, or a road rage assault in rush hour traffic, or even a random shooting by an anonymous sniper from an overpass. The danger is particularly acute when the motorist is stranded as the result of a disabled vehicle.

The scenario in the present case is every motorist's nightmare. Losses resulting from a violent encounter with this ageless road hazard-i.e., the highwayman or opportunistic thug-might reasonably be said to be very much in the contemplation of Florida consumers when they are contracting to purchase auto insurance. The motivation of the assailant-whether it be to “possess or use” the vehicle, or to steal the victim's wallet or purse, or simply to harm the victim-is a nonissue to the consumer. We note that insurance companies were placed on notice at the time of enactment of section 627.736(1)... that the statute contemplates broad coverage.

The supreme court held that the driver's injuries were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of-- and that the injuries arose out of--the "ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle” and were therefore covered under the PIP portion of his auto insurance policy.

Nation Law Firm Attorney Paul Perkins filed a lawsuit against Nationwide for failing to pay the PIP benefits under the clear pronouncement from the Supreme Court that road rage incidents are covered by PIP. In the past, we have successfully handled several cases where PIP insurers have refused to pay medical expenses incurred in these types of road-rage incidents.

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Victory in Battle Over Who is a "Resident Relative"

The Nation Law Firm was recently successful in a suit against Progressive Select Insurance Company for Personal Injury Protection benefits.

Our client was injured in a car accident and sought PIP benefits from Progressive, which insured the car he was riding in at the time of the accident.  Progressive denied the claim and said that our client should file for PIP with Allstate (which insured his grandmother's automobile). It was Progressive's position that our client was a "resident relative" with his grandmother at the time of the crash and, since his grandmother carried PIP with Allstate, he should seek PIP benefits from Allstate. Allstate denied the claim because his grandmother gave a recorded statement to Allstate and claimed that he was not a resident relative at the time of the crash.

The law in Florida is clear on which PIP carrier must provide coverage. The first place to look for PIP is the injured person's own insurance company if he owns a car. If he has his own PIP, then that insurer will provide coverage. If he owns a car and does not carry PIP, then no PIP will be afforded. (One is not required to carry PIP on an "inoperable" car). The next place to look for PIP is from the auto insurer of a "resident relative." If a resident relative has PIP, then that insurer will provide coverage. Finally, if there is no other PIP available from the first two sources, then the last place to look for PIP is from the insurer of the car in which the injured person was riding at the time of the crash.

At the time of the crash, our client owed a car, but it was inoperable. He did not carry PIP on that car. Thus, PIP had to come from either his grandmother's PIP as a resident relative; or from Progressive as the insurer for the car in which he was injured. The battle lines were drawn - the case turned on the factual issue of whether our client was, or was not, a resident relative with his grandmother at the time of the crash.

Two days before the accident which injured him, our client had moved out of his grandmother's house after a fight. At the time of the crash, and for some time after, he moved from place to place, but did not return to sleep at his grandmother's. At the time of the crash, his driver's license still had grandmother's address, he still got mail at his grandmother's house, he still had his belongings at his grandmother's house. But, he never slept at her house after leaving two days before the accident. This was still all true some two years after the accident also. Our client testified that at the time of the accident, he had no intent to move back to his grandmother's house.

We filed a declaratory judgment action against Progressive seeking a judicial determination that he was not a resident relative of his grandmother at the time of the crash. Just last week, after much discovery, Progressive agreed to pay the PIP claim in full, and to pay all of our attorney's fees and costs incurred in prosecuting the case.
 

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Uninsured Motorists Statute of Limitations Extended if it Is a Compulsory Counterclaim

The typical statute of limitations on an uninsured motorists claim is 5 years from the date of the accident. In Rundell v. Progressive Express Insurance Company, 33 FLW D2665 (Fla. 1st DCA November 17, 2008), Progressive filed a declaratory judgment action alleging that there was no UM coverage for a passenger injured in an accident.

More than 5 years from the date of the accident, the passenger sought UM benefits under the policy. Progressive sought a declaration that the claim was barred by the 5 year statute of limitations. The Court first confirmed that the passenger’s UM claim was a compulsory counterclaim; and then, citing Londono v. Turkey Creek, Inc., 609 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 1992), held that in cases where the damages are “fungible,” such as for money damages, the “statutes of limitations do not apply to compulsory counterclaims.”
 

What Can Providers Charge Under PIP After January 1, 2008?

What Can Providers Charge Under PIP After January 1, 2008?
 

For most providers outside of an emergency hospital setting, PIP insurers are allowed to limit reimbursement to 80% of 200% of the Medicare allowable charges. If the CPT code that the provider is billing for is not contained in the Medicare Fee Schedule, then the provider has to bill under the Florida Workers Compensation Fee Schedule set forth at Florida Statutes Section 440.13 and rules adopted thereunder which are in effect at the time such services, supplies, or care are provided.  Services, supplies, or care that are not reimbursable under Medicare or workers' compensation are not required to be reimbursed by the insurance company. 

The "applicable fee schedule or payment limitation under Medicare is the fee schedule or payment limitation in effect at the time the services, supplies, or care were rendered and fo the area in which such services were rendered, except that it may not be less than the applicable 2007 Medicare Part B fee schedule for medical services, supplies, and care subject to Medicare Part B. "

There is no limitation on the number of treatments or other utilization limits that apply under Medicare or workers' compensation. 

If the PIP insurer limits payments under Medicare or the Workers' Compensation Fee schedule, "the person providing such services, supplies, or care may not bill or attempt to collect from the insured any amount in excess of such limits, except for amounts that are not covered by the insured's personal injury protection coverage due to the coinsurance amount or maximum policy limits."

There are three different Medicare Fee Schedule (Participating, Non-Participating and Not Limiting). The statute does not specify which column providers should use to calculate the Medicare allowable.  It is unclear which coloumn should be used.  "Not Limiting" is the highest, and "Participating" is the lowest.  In the past, when MRI's were placed on the Medicare Fee Schedule, court's ruled that payment was limited to the Participating rate. 

When PIP Payments Only Went Toward Medical Expenses, PIP Setoff Should Not Be Applied to Past Lost Wages

The Third District has held that personal injury protection (PIP) benefits should only be setoff against those categories of damages actually paid for by PIP.  This decision could impact whether PIP benefits should be requested for, and allocated to, medical bills or lost wages. 

The Third District issued its opinion in Benites v. Almeida today (12/12/07).   The court reviewed a post-verdict setoff for personal injury protection (PIP) benefits, where the verdict attributed a certain specific sum for past medical expenses, and a certain sum for past lost wages.  Since the injured party exhausted all his PIP benefits for payment of medical expenses and allocated/accepted no benefits for lost wages, the court held PIP should only be set off against that portion of the verdict awarding past medical expenses. The court held the jury award of past wages was unaffected by the setoff.

After being injured in an auto collision, the PIP insured submitted medical bills of $18,702 to his PIP insurance company. The PIP printout showed the insured exhausted his $10,000 in PIP benefits, and all PIP benefits were applied to medical expenses. 

The insured then brought suit against the defendants, contending that he had suffered a permanent injury. The jury, however, returned a verdict finding "no permanency."  Significantly, the jury awarded $5,000 for past medical expenses and $2,500 for lost earnings, for a total verdict of $7,500. 

The question of the PIP setoff against the jury's verdict was submitted to the trial court post-trial.

The parties agreed the entire $10,000 PIP insurance coverage was expended for medical bills and agreed none was paid for lost wages. The PIP insured argued that since the PIP benefits were paid for medical bills only, the PIP setoff only applied to the $5,000 for past medical expenses, leaving the jury's past lost wage award untouched.  The defendants disagreed, and argued that the $10,000 PIP amount should be aggregated and applied to the total verdict of $7,500, which would result in a "zero" recovery for the PIP insured.

Under the no-fault law, a PIP insured has "no right to recover any damages for which personal injury protection benefits are paid or payable." ยง 627.736(3), Fla. Stat. (2003). The Florida Supreme Court's decision in Rollins v. Pizzarelli, 761 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 2000), interpreted the phrase "paid or payable" narrowly, and said "the proper interpretation of the term 'payable' is that only PIP benefits 'currently payable' or owed by the PIP carrier as a result of expenses incurred by the plaintiff should be set off from a verdict that includes an award of future medical expenses." Id. at 301.

The Third District held it was undisputed that the entire $10,000 in PIP was "paid" for medical benefit to the PIP insured.  This payment exhausted the PIP benefits and left nothing "payable."   The Court further held that because all of the PIP benefits were applied to medical expenses, the setoff could only be made against the jury's $5,000 line item for past medical expenses, leaving the $2,500 verdict for lost wages untouched. 

The opinion makes sense, and presumably would support an argument for proportional allocation of the PIP setoff.  When an insurance company has paid out all the PIP benefits, whatever portion of PIP was allocated to medical bills should be set off against a jury award of medical bills, not lost wages.  Similarly, whatever portion of PIP was allocated to lost wages should not be set off against medical bills.  In many cases, this division would become moot.  However, in cases where no permanency is found or where small proposals for settlement are involved, the allocation may be the difference between "something" and "nothing" for the injured party as it was in this case.