Motion for Rehearing Does Not Toll Time to File Motion for Attorneys Fees

I have written several times concerning Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.525, and the absolute necessity to file a Motion for Attorneys Fees: 1) within 30 days after the filing of the judgment, or 2) within 30 days after becoming entitled to fees if no judgment is filed.  In Jackson v. Betty Holmes Anthony, ____ So.3d ____ (Fla. 1st DCA July 23, 2010), the Court held:

1.  A Motion for Rehearing does not toll the 30-day time limit in rule 1.525.

2.  A post-trial Motion to Admit and Consider Newly Discovered Evidence, does not toll the 30-day time limit. 

3rd DCA Approves Motion for Attorneys Fees Filed 11 Months After Receiving Summary Judgment

Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.525 requires that any party seeking to tax attorney’s fees and costs “shall serve a motion no later than 30 days after filing of the judgment, including a judgment of dismissal, or the service of a notice of voluntary dismissal.”

In Ramle International Corporation v. The Greens Condominium Association, ____ So.3d ____ (Fla. 3rd DCA February 10, 2010), final summary judgment was entered in favor of Ramle and against The Greens.  The summary judgment found that Ramle was entitled to attorneys fees and costs, and reserved jurisdiction to determine the amount of those fees and costs.  Some 11 months later, Ramle filed its motion to determine attorney's fees and costs.  The Greens opposed the motions for fees and costs citing Rule 1.525. 

The 3rd DCA, quoting the Supreme Court's decision of Amerus Life Ins. Co. v. Lait, 2 So.3d 203 (Fla. 2009), held

Once the trial court determines that the prevailing party is entitled to attorneys' fees and costs, the losing party is aware that it is required to pay the fees and costs. At that point, the concerns of prejudice and unfair surprise to the losing party are eliminated, thus eliminating the need to apply the thirty-day time requirement under rule 1.525.

I previously blogged on the Lait decision here

http://www.floridainsuranceblog.com/2009/02/articles/attorneys-fees/florida-supreme-court-clarifies-when-motion-for-attorneys-fees-and-costs-must-be-filed/

 

2nd DCA Discusses When Attorneys Fees are Due After Insurer Demands Appraisal

In Clifton v. United Casualty Insurance Company of America, ____ So.3d ____ (Fla. 2nd DCA February 12, 2010), Clifton sustained damage to his home due to Hurricane Charlie. Clifton notified United, his homeowners insurer, of the loss and United inspected the home. United made a payment for what it considered the compensable damage.

Clifton states that he them complained numerous times to United and to his insurance agent that the payment was inadequate. After his complaints were ignored, Clifton filed suit against United for breach of contract.

United then moved for appraisal which the trial court ordered. The appraisal resulted in an award for $18,744.24. United paid this amount and Clifton then moved for attorneys fees. United moved for summary judgment and filed a response to the motion for attorneys fees. United argued that it was not responsible for those fees because it had not wrongfully withheld any insurance benefits. United claimed – with no record evidence to support it – that it was unaware that Clifton was dissatisfied with its prior payments. In response to the motion for summary judgment Clifton filed an affidavit outlining his repeated attempts to notify both United and his agent that the prior payment was insufficient. The trial court granted United’s summary judgment and denied Clifton’s motion for attorneys fees.

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Attorney's Fee Award Reversed for Failing to Make Written Finding as to Reasonable Number of Hours

In Palm Beach Polo, Inc. v. TJ Palm Beach Associate, L.P., ____ So.3d ____ (Fla. 4th DCA November 25, 2009), the trial court granted TJ Palm's motion for attorneys fees and awarded fees. 

Palm Beach Polo appealed, arguing that the trial court failed to make express written findings in its order as to the time reasonably expended by, and the hourly rates of, Appellee's attorneys.  As to the number of hours expended, the 4th DCA reversed, and ordered the trial court to set forth with specificity the reasonable number of hours expended by Appellee's attorneys.   The DCA found that the trial court's failure to set forth a specific hourly rate was harmless "because the court referenced another portion of the record which listed those rates, thereby adopting the rates as reasonable." 

Important Decision on Fee Multiplier Issued by 1st DCA

Today, in Massie v. Progressive Express Insurance Company, ____ So.3d ____ (Fla. 1st DCA November 17, 2009), the Circuit Court sitting in its appellate capacity reversed the trial judge's order awarding a multiplier.  The Circuit Court reversed because the insured did not testify that she had difficulty securing counsel to represent her in the cause without a multiplier.   

The 1st DCA reversed and reinstated the multiplier.  The Court held that

expert testimony that a party would have difficulty securing counsel without the opportunity for a multiplier supposts a multiplier's imposition.  Here, Petitioner presented such testimony, and the Circuit Court departed from the essential requirements of law by failing to apply a principle of law previously enunciated by this Court rather than that of our sister Fifth Disctrict Court of Appeal. 

The 5th DCA decision which the Court was referring to is Progressive Express Insurance Co. v. Schultz, 948 So.2d 1027 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007).  I was actually the fee expert in Schultz and have been regretting this holding for about 2 years now.  Hopefully, now that there is conflict between Schultz and Massie the Supreme Court will rule on this issue. 

A copy of the Massie decision can be downloaded by clicking here.

Attorneys Fees Granted to Insured who Filed Suit After Insurer Demanded Appraisal

In Lewis v. Universal Property and Casualty Insurance Co., ____ So.3d ____ (Fla. 4th DCA June 3, 2009), the insureds sustained damage to the roof on their home as a result of Hurricane Wilma.  The insureds believed that the insurer should pay to replace their entire roof.  In a November 16, 2006 letter, the insurer advised the insureds that based on its engineer's report, it would only pay for 1 square foot of concrete tile shingles, and 120 linear feet of ridge tiles.  According the insurer, the remainder of the damage was due to aging, wear and tear or construction deficiencies.  In this letter, the insurer advised the insureds of their right to invoke the mediation and/or appraisal provisions of the policy and that the insurer was "closing its file." 

Thereafter, the parties participated in mediation which impassed.  The insureds then retained counsel who mailed a letter with a copy of a civil complaint to the insurer.  The insurer responded by demanding appraisal under the policy and also noting that it reserved its right to "deny the claim."  Shortly thereafter, the insureds' attorney filed suit.  Over the insureds' objections, the legal case was stayed while the matter proceeded to appraisal.  The appraisal resulted in the insurer paying its insureds over $51,000. 

After the appraisal, the attorney for the insureds filed a motion for attorneys fees pursuant to 627.428.  The insurer objected to paying fees, claiming that the insureds were not entitled to fees because: 1) the insurer had invoked its appraisal clause before filing suit; and 2) the insured had never confirmed the appraisal award and obtained a judgment. 

The Court noted that there are some cases denying fees when the lawsuit is filed after the insurer invokes its right to appraisal, but according to the Court:

The decisions in these cases plainly indicate that whether suit is filed before or after the invocation of the appraisal process is not determinative of the insured's right to fees; rather, the right to fees turns upon whether the filing of the suit served a legitimate purpose.

The Court then held that the lawsuit in this case did serve a legitimate purpose.  According to the Court:

Here, more than a year after the loss, the insurer was taking the position that the bulk of the damage to the roof was not covered and indicating to the insured that it intended to take no further action and was 'closing [its] file.'  The insureds thus invoked their right to mediation under the insurance contract.  When this failed to resolve the dispute, the insured hired counsel and threatened suit, sending the insurer a draft complaint, stating a claim for breach of contract.  Only after the insureds' counsel sent the letter and draft complaint did the insurer invoke its right to an appraisal and, even in invoking such right, the insurer asserted it was retaining the right to deny the claim.  The insureds then filed suit, stating a claim for breach of contract and seeking a declaratory judgment regarding coverage.  These circumstances are not indicative of an insured who 'raced to the courthouse' or who filed suit simply for the purpose of securing a fee award. 

With regard to whether the insured was required to confirm the appraisal award and obtain a judgment, the Court stated:

And, while it is true that the trial court never entered judgment or an order confirming the appraisal award, it is undisputed that the insurer paid the claim.  Florida law squarely holds that 'payment after suit was filed operates as a confession of judgment...entitling [the insured] to attorney's fees.

As a result, the Court ultimately held that the insureds were indeed entitled to prevailing party attorneys fees under 627.428. 

5th DCA Denies Attorneys Fees to Insured in Certiorari Proceedings

In Grider-Garcia v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, ____ F.3d ____ (Fla. 5th DCA June 12, 2009), the insured sought a writ of certiorari to quash two orders rendered at the trial court level.  The 5th DCA denied the requests for certiorari review, holding that the issues could be handled on a final appeal at the end of the case. 

The Court then had to deal with the issue of whether the insured would be entitled to a "conditional" award of attorneys fees incurred in presenting the petition for certiorari contingent upon the insured ultimately winning the underlying case. 

In reliance on Bass & Singer, P.A. v. United Automobile Insurance Co., 944 So.2d 252 (Fla. 2006), the 5th DCA ruled that the insured who is unsuccessful in a Petition for Certiorari can not recover attorneys fees for the Petition even if the insured ultimately wins the underlying case.  Specifically, the Court held:

Given the [Supreme] court's narrow interpretation of the language of section 627.428, it appears that this Court is not authorized to grant fees to an insured who does not succeed in his or her application for certiorari.

Equally, troubling for insureds is the following statement by the 5th:

indeed, it is doubtful that an insured would even be entitled to fees for a certiorari proceeding in which it prevails based on the interpretation of the statute that appellate courts are authorized to award fees only for an appeal that the insured wins. 

Whether the court would actually refuse to conditionally grant attorneys fees to an insured who successfully pursue certiorari review remains to be seen.  However, given this dictum, counsel for insureds - at least in the 5th DCA - had better think twice before filing a Petition for Certiorari unless it is absolutely necessary. 

The insured in this case and in Brass & Singer, argued that such rulings violate the purposes behind 627.428 - to make the insured whole - but the courts rejected this argument. 

Interest on Court Ordered Attorney's Fees

In Hingson v. MMI of Florida, Inc., ____ So.2d ____ (Fla. 2nd DCA March 18, 2009), the trial court required the losing party to pay the prevailing parties attorney's fees.  However, the trial court refused to award prejudgment interest on the attorney's fees from the date which the prevailing party became entitled to the the attorney's fees. 

The 2nd DCA reversed this decision, and quoting the Supreme Court's in Quality Engineered Installation, Inc. v. Higley South, Inc., 670 So.2d 929, 930-31 (Fla. 1996), held that

interest accrues from the date the entitlement to attorneys fees is fixed through agreement, arbitration award, or court determination, even though the amount of the award has not yet been determined.

 

4th DCA Affirms Attorneys Fees in Case to Set Location of UM Arbitration

In Pawtucket Mutual Insurance Company v. Manganelli, 34 FLW D386 (Fla. 4th DCA February 18, 2009), Pawtucket provided uninsured motorists coverage to the Manganelli's who had been injured in a car accident.  Under the UM policy, the Manganelli's requested to arbitrate their UM claim with Pawtucket.  The policy provided that such arbitration take place where the insureds "live."  Pawtucket claimed that the Manganelli's lived in New Hampshire, while the Manganelli's stated  they lived in Palm Beach, Florida. 

The Manganelli's filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that they indeed "lived" in Palm Beach County and that the arbitration should take place there.  The trial court ruled in the Manganelli's favor, and they moved for attorneys fees under Florida Statutes Section 627.428 and 627.727(8).  The trial court granted the Manganelli's request for fees, and Pawtucket appealed. 

The 4th DCA affirmed, ruling that the award of attorneys fees was appropriate where the carrier wrongfully caused the insured to resort to litigation to resolve a conflict.  According to the court, "[t]hough Pawtucket did not deny coverage per se, by maintaining that arbitration had to take place in New Hampshire, it forced Manganelli to engage in litigation unnecessarily in the face of Manganelli's insistence that he 'lived' in Palm Beach County." 

3rd DCA Affirms Attorneys Fees After Appraisal

In Citizens Property Insurance Corporation v. Cuban-Hebrew Congregation of Miami, Inc., 34 FLW D333 (Fla. 3rd DCA February 11, 2009), the insured property was damaged by wind, and Citizens paid what it believed was the appropriate amount under its policy.  Thereafter, the insured filed suit against Citizens for breach of the insurance contract for underpaying the claim.  The trial court compelled appraisal pursuant to the appraisal clause.  

The appraisal ultimately resulted in an additional payment from Citizens to its insured of $106,646.27.  The trial court granted the insured attorneys fees under Florida Statute Section 627.428.  Citizens appealed the grant of attorneys fees.  The 3rd DCA affirmed the award of attorneys fees stating:

In this case Citizens had underpaid the insured by $106,646.27.  The insured filed suit on the policy.  This was followed by the appraisal and culminated in the judgment in favor of the insured for the additional sum.  We affirm the award of attorney's fees on authority of Travelers Indemnity Insurance Co. of Illinois v. Meadows MRI, LLP, 900 So.2d 676, 679 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). 

For other cases in this blog on the award of attorney's fees after appraisal, click on the tag, "Attorney's Fees" below. 

 

Florida Supreme Court Clarifies When Motion For Attorney's Fees and Costs Must Be Filed

Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.525 requires that any party seeking to tax attorney’s fees and costs “shall serve a motion no later than 30 days after filing of the judgment, including a judgment of dismissal, or the service of a notice of voluntary dismissal.”

Not surprisingly, the application of this fairly straightforward rule has resulted in a great deal of litigation. On January 29, 2009, in Amerus Life Insurance Company v. Michael Lait, 34 Fla. L. Weekly S49a (Florida Supreme Court), the Florida Supreme Court further clarified when a motion for attorney’s fees and costs must be filed.

The final judgment in Lait contained a recitation that Lait was “liable to the plaintiff” for prejudgment interest, court costs and attorneys' fees, “which are reserved at this time.” Then, some eight months later, the plaintiff filed a motion to determine the amount of attorney’s fees and costs. Lait opposed the award of fees and costs, citing the 30-day requirement set forth in Rule 1.525. The trial court refused to award attorney’s fees and costs under Rule 1,525. The 5th DCA affirmed the denial of fees and costs. The 5th DCA relied primarily on the Florida Supreme Court’s holding in Saia Motor Freight Line, Inc. v. Reid, 930 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 2006).

The issue was then appealed to the Florida Supreme Court which agreed to hear the case under direct conflict jurisdiction. The Supreme Court distinguished Saia, and reversed. In so doing, the Supreme Court stated that the 30-day time requirement under rule 1.525 does not apply when the trial court has already determined entitlement to attorneys' fees and costs, and only reserves jurisdiction to determine the amount.

In the report of the Florida Bar Civil Procedure Rules Committee, the committee unanimously agreed that the purpose behind adopting rule 1.525 was “predictability and clarification.” Thus, the thirty-day time requirement under rule 1.525 avoids prejudice and unfair surprise to the losing party. Once the trial court determines that the prevailing party is entitled to attorneys' fees and costs, the losing party is aware that it is required to pay the fees and costs. At that point, the concerns of prejudice and unfair surprise to the losing party are eliminated, thus eliminating the need to apply the thirty-day time requirement under rule 1.525. As the Fifth District indicated in dicta in Hart v. City of Groveland, 919 So. 2d 665, 669 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006), “[i]f a party already has a judgment granting attorney's fees and costs, it would appear superfluous to require such a party to file a motion seeking to tax them again. The court has, in essence, already ruled to tax them and all that remains is a determination of the reasonable amount.”

 

Third District Awards Attorney's Fees for Appraisal Win

The courts continue to award attorneys fees as the result of appraisal, even upon timely payment of the appraisal award by the insurer. 

On November 19, 2008, the Third District Court of Appeal issued its opinion in Holder v. State Farm Insurance Company.    After the insured suffered hurricane damage, the State Farm adjuster offered (and non-binding mediation confirmed) the insured had $9,065.00 in covered losses.  The insured had a $9,000.00 deductible, leaving a net of $65.00 in insurance proceeds for the hurricane loss.

A year later, the insured filed suit, and State Farm invoked the binding arbitration clause of the policy.  The loss was appraised, and resulted in an appraisal award of $50,178.60.  State Farm promply paid the loss.  However, even though the filing of the lawsuit directly resulted in the payment of over 500 times the amount previously offered, the trial judge denied a claim for attorney’s fees.

The Third DCA reversed the trial court's denial of attorney's fees, citing Ajmechet v. United Automobile Ins. Co., 790 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).  Ajmechet states:

When the carrier did not pay Ms. Ajmechet’s claim for her stolen, insured car, she sued the company in the circuit court, where the insurer demanded appraisal. After the appraisers determined the amount of the loss, the carrier paid the award without further ado. Because the payment was obviously effected by the law suit, we hold the insured was entitled to fees under section 627.428, Florida Statutes (2001).

(citation omitted)  It should be clear that when an insurer forces its insured into litigation to recover proceeds that are owed under the policy, the insurer is responsible for attorney's fees.

Court Says No Need to File Timesheets with Fee Motion

 In the recent case of McDaniel v. Edmonds, 2008 WL 285272 (Fla. 2nd DCA July 25, 2008), the court held that the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a party to file timesheets, affidavits, or other evidence along with a timely motion for attorney's fees.

In McDaniel, the previaling parties sought to recover attorney's fees and costs after successfully prosecuting their action. Significantly, the trial court made a determination the prevailing parties were actually entitled to fees and costs. However, the trial court denied the parties' motion for fees and costs.

The prevaling party's motion for attorney's fees and costs was simple and straightforward, referencing the court's prior ruling on entitlement to fees, and asked the court to proceed to set the amount of fees and costs "to comply with the time limitations imposed by the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure."

The trial court denied the motion as facially insufficient because it did not specifically allege a legal basis for attorney's fees and costs.

Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.100(b) requires that a motion "shall state with particularity the grounds therefor, and shall set forth the relief or order sought."

The prevailing parties appealed the trial court's denial of their motion. The appellate court held that the prevailing parties' motion sought attorney's fees and costs that the trial court had already determined they were entitled to recover. The appellate court determined that the specific legal basis for the fee award was not at issue in the motion; that at the time the prevailing parties filed their motion, the only remaining issue was the amount of fees and costs.

On appeal, the defendant alternatively argued that the trial court's denial should be upheld because the prevailing parties failed to request a particular amount of fees or costs, and failed to identify the specific costs sought and legal services performed.

The appellate court also dismissed this argument, holding that Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.100(b) does not impose a requirement that motions for attorney's fees and costs be accompanied by affidavits setting forth the amount of fees and costs claimed. This is similar to the federal rule. The advisory committee notes to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54 state, in pertinent part:

"The rule does not require that the motion be supported at the time of filing with the evidentiary material bearing on the fees. This material must of course be submitted in due course, according to such schedule as the court may direct in light of the circumstances of the case. What is required is the filing of a motion sufficient to alert the adversary and the court that there is a claim for fees, and the amount of such fees (or a fair estimate)."

Therefore, while it is important to ensure that post trial motions for attorney's fees and costs are sufficiently detailed and state "with particularity" the grounds and relief sought, nothing in the Rules of Civil Procedure requires that attorney time sheets, affidavits, or other supporting information must be filed with the fee motion.

Insurer Failed to Prove Cancellation--57.105 Attorney's Fees Granted to Insured

The appellate court reversed summary judgment for an insurer when the insurer couldn't prove it met statutory conditions for notifying the insured about cancellation of his policy.  The court determined that, because the insurer knew its evidence did not support summary judgment in its favor, attorneys fees under Section 57.105, Fla. Stat. for the insured were an appropriate sanction.

In Magee v. American Southern Home Ins. Co., a Florida Corporation, issued June 2, 2008,
the First District Court of Appeal reversed summary judgment entered for a Florida insurance company. 

In Magee, the insured filed a complaint against his insurance company, alleging breach of contract for its refusal to pay a claim made under the applicable policy.  The Florida insurer denied the insured's claim, asserting it canceled the policy for nonpayment of premium with an effective cancellation date prior to the date of the accident.

The insurer asserted it had mailed premium notices and a cancellation notice, but the insured testified he never received any premium or cancellation notice at the appropriate address, and only received a cancellation notice by certified mail at a different address "way after" the accident occurred. Section 627.7281, Fla. Stat. requires at least 10 days notice of cancellation for nonpayment of premium prior to the cancellation effective date.

As its sole grounds for summary judgment, the Florida insurance company
offered a portion of a certificate of mailing report; and (2) a certificate of bulk mailing.  In a footnote in its appellate Answer Brief, the insurance company admitted the certificates of mailing it offered were from a different day, and did not include the subject mailing.  Although it still sought affirmance of the summary judgment on appeal, the insurance company admitted it offered no proof that the insured's cancellation documents were actually mailed.

The appellate court naturally reversed the summary judgment.  Wisely, counsel for the insured filed a motion for attorney's fees under
section 57.105, Fla. Stat.  The court noted that despite the stringent standard required to support summary judgment, and the Florida insurance company's admission that the evidence it offered did not represent what it was purported to represent, the insurance company continued to assert on appeal that the judgment should be affirmed. The court held that clearly the insurer "knew or should have known its defense of the trial court's order was not supported by the necessary material facts," and it was the insurer's "duty to timely confess error."

This case reveals why it is important to verify the insurance company as strictly complied with notice requirements, and to seek all available recourse when the insurer advances a frivolous and unmerited position.

First DCA Recognizes Waiver of the Waiver of Attorneys Fees....

In Rabbit Hill Homeowners Assoc., Inc. v. Cory, The First District Court of appeal recognized that in certain circumstances, a party's failure to plead entitlement to attorney's fees is not always fatal.

The Court held there can be a waiver of the waiver of fees.

The First DCA noted "the record contains competent substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding that the appellant recognized and acquiesced to appellees' claim for attorney's fees and, accordingly, waived its right to insist that the claim be set forth in a pleading."

5th District Holds Payment of Appraisal Award is Confession of Judgment

When insureds are forced to sue their insurance company in order to receive benefits (not attorneys fees and costs), any payment of insurance policy proceeds by the insurance company should act as a confession of judgment, entitling the insured to properly pled attorney's fees.

In Jerkins v. USF & G Specialty Ins. Co., 2008 WL 678667, 33 Fla. L. Weekly D763 (Fla. 5th DCA March 14, 2008), the insureds sustained damage to their home due to Hurricane Charlie.  The insurance company's claims adjuster determined that the insureds sustained only $715.60 property damage due to the hurricane.  This claim was less than the insurance policy's deductible, and the insurance company made no payment on the claim.

Six months later, the insureds filed a breach of contract action against the insurance company.  The insurance company filed a motion to dismiss or abate the insured's suit in favor of appraisal, in accordance with the insurance policy, which provided, in pertinent part: "If you and we fail to agree on the amount of loss, either may ... Demand an appraisal of the loss...."

After the motion to dismiss was filed, the parties actually went forward with the appraisal process.  The appraisers determined the insureds actual loss was $9,084.29.  The insurance company paid the entire appraisal amount, minus the deductible.

Following payment, the insureds filed a motion for attorney's fee and costs pursuant to Section 627.428, Fla. Stat.  In their motion, the insureds maintained that the insurance company's payment constituted a "confession of judgment," entitling the insureds to attorney's fees.   However, in its opposition to the motion for attorney's fees, the insurance company argued that the insureds were not entitled to attorney's fees because the parties' dispute was resolved through appraisal, not litigation.  After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion for attorney's fees, citing Federated National Insurance Co. v. Esposito, 937 So.2d 199 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), in support of its decision.

The Fifth DCA determined that generally, payment made after a suit is filed operates as a confession of judgment.  The court claimed it was neither reasonable nor just to allow an insurance company to avoid statutory attorneys fees by simply paying insurance proceeds at some point after suit is filed but before final judgment is entered, likening voluntary payment of the insurer to the equivalent of a confession of judgment.  

The court cited its previous analysis of the confession of judgment doctrine as it relates to section 627.428, in State Farm Florida Insurance Co. v. Lorenzo, 969 So.2d 393, 397-98 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007), where the court determined the confession of judgment doctrine turned on the policy underlying section 627.428: discouraging insurers from contesting valid claims and reimbursing insureds for attorney's fees when they must sue to receive the benefits owed to them.   The court also noted the doctrine is generally not applied where the insureds were not forced to sue the insurance company to receive benefits, because otherwise applying the doctrine would encourage unnecessary litigation by rewarding a race to the courthouse for attorney's fees even where the insurer was complying with its obligations under the policy.

The court further reiterated that while Florida law does hold that payments are treated as confessions of judgment where an insurer first disputes the claim and then settles, "the existence of a bona fide dispute and not the mere possibility of a dispute, is a crucial condition precedent to such a holding."

The court determined the sixth month time lapse between claim and lawsuit, combined with the significant difference in the value of the damages, met the confession of judgment doctrine's standards.

Interestingly, the court commented that if the insurance company's policy contained a mandatory arbitration or appraisal provision, the insureds would not be entitled to attorney's fees under section 627.428.  Since the appraisal clause was permissive, the court did not see appraisal as a condition precedent to filing suit (and therefore recovering attorneys fees under the confession of judgment doctrine).  

Significantly, the court distinguished Federal National Insurance Company v. Esposito, 937 So.2d 199 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), which the trial court relied upon to deny the insured's motion for attorney's fees and costs.  In Esposito, the insured invoked the appraisal process to settle a dispute she had with her insurance company over the value of hurricane damage to a structure.  Through the appraisal process, the parties agreed upon a value of the damage and the insurer paid the appraisal award in full.  Only after the appraisal process was well underway did the insured file an action seeking to confirm the appraisal award and attorney's fees. The Esposito court held that the trial court erred in confirming the appraisal award and entering judgment in favor of the insured because the parties settled their dispute without litigation.  The court determined the Esposito lawsuit was solely filed to obtain fees, not to settle a dispute. 

Declaratory Judgment Is a "Final Judgment" for Attorney's Fees Purposes

A sobering reminder about timely moving for attorneys fees in declaratory judgment actions was issued by the Fourth District Court of Appeal. In Cardillo v. Qualsure Insurance Corp., out of the 4th DCA on February 20, 2007, the court determined a fairly innocuous "Order" which established insurance coverage--but left issues of liaiblity and damages set for a jury trial--was a "judgment" for purposes of Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.525.

Cardillo was initially sued for personal injury. The defendant insured then filed a liability claim with his insurance company. The insurance company contested coverage and its duty to defend. The insurance company then sought a declaratory judgment of its rights and obligations pursuant to section 86.011, Florida Statutes.

On December 1, 2004, the trial court entered an order titled "Findings of Fact - Conclusions of Law-And Order Regarding Trial." In the order, the trial court stated that certain claims of the insured remain pending in the underlying litigation, but based upon the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, those issues were no longer "outcome determinative" of the declaratory decree action. In paragraph four of the trial court's order, the court determined that insurance coverage existed under the policy. Next, the order announced that "[a]ll remaining issues of liability and damages" proceed to a jury trial set the following month; "[a]ll stays previously entered . . . are lifted and all counsel advised to be fully ready to commence trial." The order then simply concluded that it is "DONE AND ORDERED."

After various procedural posturings, and upon request, the trial court entered a "judgment," which stated that the " Order rendered on December 1, 2004 is a Final Judgment, for which let execution issue, if appropriate."

On February 17, 2005, the insured filed a motion for attorney's fees pursuant to section 627.428, Florida Statutes.

The question before the appellate court was whether the December 1st order constituted a final order or judgment which would start the 30 day time limit in Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.525. The court stated that Rule 1.525 applies equally, regardless of whether the time runs from a document titled "order," "final order," "judgment," or "final judgment," as long as the document is a final resolution of the rights and obligations of the parties. The court then concluded that the December 1st order was a final order regard the dec action, stating:

"Patently, it was the intent of the trial court that nothing further should stand as an obstacle to concluding the underlying case and that the declaratory issues were 'disposed of.' The language of the order is more than sufficient to alert counsel that the clock is ticking as to a fee motion."

Since Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.525 is no longer construed as requiring a party to move for attorneys fees after a judgment is entered (For clarification of this issue, including effect of the 2005 amendment and interpretation of the Rule pre-amendment) see Barco v. School Board of Pinellas County, 2008 WL 321469 (Fla. Feb. 7, 2008)), and since nothing prohibits a party from moving for attorneys fees before a judgment is actually entered (Barco, above), it would be prudent to file a motion for attorneys fees within 30 days of any order that could be construed as being dispositive of insurance coverage.

Federal Court Holds No Attorney's Fees for Merely Establishing Coverage

    It seems axiomatic that when an insured has to institute litigation against its insurance company to determine whether or not insurance coverage exists, and insurance coverage is found to exists, the insured should be entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to Section 627.428, Fla. Stat.  However, as seen by a recent Federal Court decision, such is not always the case.
     

    In Mizner Tower Condominium Assoc., Inc. v. QBE Ins. Corp. 2008 WL 151414 (S.D.Fla. Jan. 15, 2008), the court determined that an insured is not entitled to attorneys fees and costs when a "judgment" does not result in payment of wrongfully denied benefits.

    In Mizner, the insurer conditionally extended a commercial residential policy to the condominium association.  Continuation of coverage (beyond a date certain) was based upon the condominium association's completion of certain loss prevention conditions.  Prior to the date certain, the insured condominium association complied with the notice requirements and informed the insurance company that the required loss prevention measures had been satisfactorily completed.

    However, nearly three months after the date certain, the insured association notified the insurer that seven of the condominium's shutters might not be in compliance with the insured's underwriting requirements.  The insured asked the insurance company to inspect the shutters and make a determination whether the insurance policy was still valid in light of the shutters.  In response, the insurer stated that the continuing insurance coverage had been conditioned upon the insured's representation that the loss prevention conditions were completed, and stated "the Association's coverage could be jeopardized due to a material misrepresentation."  The insurer took no further action, and apparently did not make a site visit to inspect the shutters or make any determination as to the validity of the policy.  

    The insured, over the next few weeks, repeatedly asked the insurance company to instruct whether or not the insurer still provided hurricane coverage, and threatened to file a declaratory judgment action if it received no response.  Ultimately, a little over a month after notifying the insurer about the problem shutters, the insured filed the dec action to establish coverage.  

    Eight days after the dec action was filed, the insurance company sent correspondence to the insured which confirmed that hurricane coverage would remain "in full force and effect for the remainder of the current policy period."   Shortly thereafter, the insurance company filed a motion to dismiss/motion for summary judgment.  The Trial court determined (1) it was undisputed that the insured sought judicial determination that the policy was valid and enforceable; (2) the insurance company provided the  insured with written confirmation that the policy was valid and enforceable; and (3) summary judgment was appropriate.   

    The insured disagreed, stating the insurance company's confirmation of a valid and enforceable policy--which came after suit was filed--operated as a confession of judgment, entitling the insured to attorney's fees pursuant to Section 627.428, Fla. Stat.  The court held that attorney's fees were not available under the facts of the case:

"The Court is unaware of, and the [insured] has not provided any, legal basis for awarding fees pursuant to the above Section in a case where a judgment does not result in payment of wrongfully denied benefits.  The [insured] seeks to apply this Section to any claim between an insured and an insurance company where the insurer prevails regardless of whether or not an insurer has wrongfully withheld payment of a valid claim for benefits.  I decline to extend this Section's reach so far."

Insured Denied Fees After Insurer Voluntarily Dismisses Petition for Appointment of Umpire


This is an interesting case where the insured sought attorneys fees and costs after the Florida insurance company filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of petition to appoint a umpire.

In Peraza v. Citizens Property Insurance, the appellate court reviewed the trial court's denial of a motion to tax costs and attorneys fees.

The insured filed a claim with her Florida insurance company for windstorm damages her property sustained during Hurricane Wilma in October, 2005.  As a result of the claim, the Insurer invoked the "appraisal clause" of her insurance policy.  Each party appointed an appraiser, but the parties' appraisers could not agree on an umpire.  The appraisal clause in the insured's policy contained a provision for petitioning the trial court to appoint an umpire.  The Florida insurance company petitioned the trial court for appointment of an umpire, and the insured filed a response indicating her agreement to the court's appointment. After the trial court entered its order  appointing an umpire, the Florida insurance company filed a voluntary dismissal under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.420.

As a result of the voluntary dismissal, the insured filed her motion to tax costs against the Florida Insurance company, including reasonable attorney's fees.  As grounds for the motion, the insured claimed entitlement to costs under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.420(d) and attorneys fees under Section 627.428(1), Fla. Stat.  The trial court denied the insured's motion. 

The Third District determined the insured's motion should be granted regarding costs, but was rightly denied on the issue of attorney's fees.  The court held that once the Florida insurance company filed its voluntary dismissal, the
insured was entitled to recover her costs.  The court cited the Florida Supreme Court's language in Wilson v. Rose Printing Co. Inc., 624 So. 2d 257, 258 (Fla. 1993): "Rule 1.420(d) is unambiguous - costs are to be assessed in the action that is the subject of the voluntary dismissal...." 

The trial court had agreed with the Florida insurance company that certain language in the insured's policy precluded the recovery of costs under Rule 1.420: "[e]ach party will (a) pay its chosen appraiser; and (b) bear the other expenses of appraisal and umpire equally." The appellate court, however, felt this language allocated the expenses for the appraisal process, but did not constituted a waiver of entitlement to court costs under Rule 1.420(d).

The Third District sustained the trial court's ruling on attorney's fees, however.  Section 627.428(1), Fla. Stat. authorizes an award of attorney's fees when an insured recovers "judgment" or a "decree" against an insurer.
The appellate court determined that the Florida insurance company Citizens filed a petition to appoint an umpire, and the insured requested the exact same relief.  The trial court's order granted the relief requested by both sides. Under these facts, the appellate court held the order was not a "judgment or decree" against the Florida insurance
company and for insured for purposes of the statute, and the insured did not meet the strict requirements of Section 627.428(1), Fla. Stat., to qualify for attorney's fees.

The issue in this case should not be confused with the situation where an insurance company files a dec action on coverage or to void a policy, and then later dismisses.  In those situations, the insured should be entitled to fees under 627.428.  One thing to always consider whenever an insurer files a dec action on coverage is to file a counter-claim for coverage.  This prevent the insurer from trying to divest the court of jurisdiction by simply dismissing the case.